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Why the Converse Consequence Condition
cannot be accepted
LUCA MORETTI
Three general confirmation principles discussed by Hempel (1965) are
the following:
Converse Consequence Condition (CCC) If an observation statement
E confirms a hypothesis H and if another hypothesis H* entails H,
then E confirms H*.
Special Consequence Condition (SCC) If an observation statement E
confirms a hypothesis H, then E confirms any of H’s logical conse-
quences.
Entailment Condition (EC) If an observation statement E entails an-
other statement E*, then E confirms E*.
Since the conjunction of the above three principles entails the para-
doxical consequence that any observation statement confirms any hy-
pothesis (see Le Morvan 1999: 449), Hempel notoriously chose to pre-
serve (SCC) and (EC), while rejecting (CCC). Yet, as Le Morvan (1999)
has pointed out, one could think of preserving (CCC) by rejecting either
(a) both (EC) and (SCC) or (b) only (EC) or (c) only (SCC). In fact, in
none of these alternatives does the condition entailing the paradox ap-
pear satisfied. Trying to save (CCC) is not pointless since, as Glymour has
emphasised, the Converse Consequence Condition ‘has had an undying
popularity, and attempts to make it work still continue’ (Glymour 1980:
30).
Le Morvan (1999) has however argued that, when the choice among
general confirmation principles is just about (CCC), (SCC) and (EC),
since none of the three alternatives (a)-(c) is actually acceptable, it is
(CCC) that must be rejected. In this paper, I aim to strengthen this argu-
ment and to make it definitive.
To begin with, according to Le Morvan, since both (EC) and (SCC) are
quite intuitive, the alternative (a), which imposes the rejection of both of
them, ‘may strike many as a too high price to pay’ (1999: 450), and thus
is scarcely acceptable. I find this consideration straightforward. Le Mor-
van has convincingly shown that also the alternative (b) is unworkable, as
the simple conjunction of (CCC) and (SCC) entails the paradoxical con-
sequence that, if an observation statement confirms a hypothesis, then the
observation statement confirms any hypothesis (see 1999: 450).1 Finally,
1 Le Morvan attributes the proof to an anonymous referee of Philosophy of Science.
Le Morvan has argued that the alternative (c) is disastrous too, as one can
deduce the paradoxical consequence that any observation statement con-
firms any hypothesis using only (EC) and (CCC).
Le Morvan’s proof against the alternative (c) rests however upon cer-
tain assumptions proper to Hempel’s conception of qualitative confirma-
tion that many methodologists would reject.2 Such methodologists could
therefore decide to preserve (CCC) in conjunction with (EC), while re-
jecting (SCC), without facing any immediate difficulty. Accordingly, since
the choice to reject (CCC) is in part based on questionable assumptions,
such a choice can be argued not to be really justified.
As I will show, it is however possible to reinforce Le Morvan’s conten-
tion that the alternative (c) is unworkable by providing a general argu-
ment, which is independent of Hempel’s specific conception of confirma-
tion, to the effect that the simple conjunction of (EC) and (CCC) entails a
disastrous consequence.
Le Morvan’s proof is the following (cf. 1999: 449–50):
(1) Let E* be a tautology.
(2) Any observation statement E entails E*. (Logical truth)
(3) Any hypothesis H entails E*. (Logical truth)
(4) Any E confirms E*. (2, EC)
(5) Any E confirms any H. (4, 3, CCC)
As Le Morvan himself recognizes, a weak point of his proof is the step
(4). For many (or, probably, most) methodologists will claim that, since
E* is by assumption a tautology, it cannot be confirmed by any statement
at all. They will urge that (EC) should obviously be intended as stating
that:
(EC*) If a statement E entails a non-tautological statement E*, then
E confirms E*.
These methodologists will finally object that, on the grounds of (EC*),
the above proof is incorrect.
Le Morvan’s reply is that accepting (EC*) would come ‘at the cost of
repudiating some key aspects of the Hempelian conception of qualitative
confirmation’ (1999: 451), which entail that tautologies like "x(Px É Px)
and $x(Px) Ú ~$x(Px) are confirmed by any observation statement (cf.
1999: 452).
In this short paper, I cannot go deeper into the criticism of such aspects
of Hempel’s view of confirmation. I will only emphasise that they could
be rejected on an intuitive basis, as they clash with the natural assumption
2 Notice that (CCC), (SCC) and (EC) are quite general and their intuitive plausibility
does not depend on any specific assumption about qualitative confirmation.
that, since tautological statements have no empirical content, they cannot
be subject to empirical confirmation (or disconfirmation).
What Le Morvan has not noticed is that there is a simple way to re-
formulate his proof whose validity does not rest on the implausible claim
that tautologies can be confirmed by evidence. Here is the new formula-
tion:
(6) Let E be any non-tautological observation statement and let H
be any hypothesis such that E Ú H is not a tautology.
(7) E entails E Ú H. (Logical truth)
(8) H entails E Ú H. (Logical truth)
(9) E confirms E Ú H. (7, 6, EC)
  (10)   E confirms H. (9, 8, CCC)
Notice that, in this proof, the crucial step (9) does not appear problem-
atic because, in accordance with (6), E Ú H is not a tautology. Notice also
that the conclusion that any observation statement E confirms any hy-
pothesis H such that their disjunction E Ú H is not a tautology is surely
unacceptable. Thus, the new proof appears not to be as questionable as
Le Morvan’s, though just as devastating. In conclusion, if the choice
among general confirmation principles is just about (CCC), (SCC) and
(EC), it seems in general correct that (CCC) must be rejected.3
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